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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REGULATING AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS STORY FOR DEMOCRACY?

CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER*

I. TWO VIEWS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
POLITICS
For at least the past four decades, national environmental law and policy
have been subjected to intense scrutiny, much of it producing withering
criticism.1 The criticisms have not been at all unified. Existing environmental
law and programs are attacked by some because they are too strict, inflexible
and expensive. At the same time, others attack those same laws and programs
because they are inadequate, insufficiently bold and under enforced.
Regardless of where a specific analysis comes out on such bottom line
questions, both the too-tough and the too-lax schools have contributed two
distinct types of critique to our environmental understanding. One type
articulates and defends a substantive position with regard to what the content
of our environmental policies ought to be. Here, the too-tough and the too-lax
viewpoints can be as critical of the other as each is of existing policy; indeed,
each regularly implies that existing policy is troubled largely because it has

* Charles S. Murphy Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies, Duke University.
A.B., Princeton Univ., 1968; M.Div., Yale Univ. 1971; J.D. Univ. California at Berkeley (Boalt
Hall), 1974. This essay is based upon a presentation given at “Ten Years After the Clean Air Act
Amendment of 1990: Have We Cleared the Air?” at Saint Louis School of Law on November 17,
2000. My thanks to Doug Williams, Amy Hoch, and all the students at Saint Louis University
School of Law who made this event a congenial and stimulating forum.
1. The end of the millennium, nearly coinciding with the thirtieth anniversary of Earth Day,
produced a wealth of comprehensive reviews and analyzes of environmental law and policy, and
many of these provide overviews of the major criticisms. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 27-38, plus sources cited in n.1
(2001). An excellent recent analysis of the shortcomings of the pollution control elements of
environmental law and policy is J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL
IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998). Comprehensive overviews of the
deep ecology criticisms of current policies are harder to find than overviews of the economicsbased criticisms. A useful examination of environmental ethics and some exploration of the
policy prescriptions that flow from non-anthropocentric traditions is PETER S. WENZ,
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS TODAY (2001). See also MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE
EARTH (1988).
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been unduly influenced by the other. A second type of critique concentrates on
the political processes that produce our environmental policies. Work in this
second stream tends to show more commonalities than does the work in the
first. Analysts who think policy is too tough often see the same deficiencies in
the political system, as do analysts who think policy is too lax.
Contributors to the first stream, the policy failure stream, endorse some
normative policy objectives and techniques and then argue that existing laws
and regulations do a very poor job in achieving those objectives. The
economic theory of environmental policy, for example, has produced
numerous analyses articulating and defending a theory of optimal pollution and
promoting market-based or incentive-based regulatory techniques.2 The great
majority of such analyses then identify particular aspects of existing laws and
regulations that are unsatisfactory when judged against this theory. To say that
the economic theory of environmental policy necessarily concludes that
environmental programs are too strict, too expensive or too rigid would be a
false over-simplification; some prominent environmental initiatives have
benefited from economic analyses that found existing policies to be too
lenient.3 Most of the contemporary work in this genre fall into this category,
however. Economic environmental theory is much more likely to be too-tough
than too-lax.
Other philosophical and intellectual traditions produce work in the policy
failure stream that faults environmental policy for not going far enough, nor
being bold enough. Non-anthropocentric theories of rights and justice, for
example, advocate greater protection for flora, fauna and ecosystems, which
can lead to criticisms of the Endangered Species Act for its narrow focus on
critical habitats and species on the brink of extinction, as opposed to broad
ecosystem management.4 Conservationists advocate commitment of greater

2. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 27-38.
3. Removing lead from gasoline, perhaps the single most outstanding success story in the
control of auto emissions, was preceded by a cost-benefit analysis showing that the limitations on
lead content then in effect did not go far enough. New research into the adverse health effects of
airborne lead showed that the health costs of any lead in gasoline were well in excess of the
performance and maintenance benefits from its continuing use. See Robert Percival, Checks
Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 188 (1991). More generally, an analysis of twelve different regulatory
cases at EPA found that in five of the cases studied, cost-benefit analysis provided support for
regulations more stringent than originally proposed by EPA. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA:
ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) (the five cases were
visibility protection for the Grand Canyon, emissions of organic chemicals, reformulated
gasoline, lead in drinking water, and lead in gasoline).
4. E.g., Michael J. Bean, Taking Stock: The Endangered Species Act in the Eye of a
Growing Storm, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 77, 83-85 (1992); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions
Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1029, 1132-1136 (1997).
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acreage of roadless wilderness areas. Theorists of environmental justice find
existing programs unresponsive to the distributive claims paramount to that
theory.5 Many deep ecologists promote a steady-state economy, or a
Conserver Society, and on those grounds advocate numerous changes in life
style, energy infrastructure, consumption patterns and the use of renewal
resources, and find much American environmental policy to be indifferent to,
or even to be incompatible with, most of these prescriptions.6
The diverse works in the policy failure literature thus reflect the rich array
of normative perspectives that our culture and traditions bring to bear on
questions of environmental policy. In one fundamental respect, however, they
all share a common orientation. Each contribution to the policy failure
literature argues from a normative ideal entirely outside the context of the
political processes through which actual policy is developed, enacted and
implemented, and each assesses actual programs currently on the books solely
with regard to how those programs fall short of carrying out that normative
ideal. This style of criticism has a long pedigree. However, insofar as such
work is written with a view toward moving actual policies in the direction of
its ideal, it suffers from a significant defect. By bracketing any analysis of the
political processes through which proposals for policy change must proceed if
they are to be realized, the policy failure literature implicitly relies upon the
motivational force of good ideas alone to effectuate change. It was just this
“idealistic view” that George Stigler castigated in 1971 when he wrote that
“preach[ing] to the commissioners or to the people who appoint the
commissioners” is useless as a method for reforming policy, because it ignores
“the basic logic of political life.”7
The second stream of critical environmental scholarship, the political
failure stream, takes seriously Stigler’s observation. Political failure criticism
seeks to understand the motivations of political actors and the dynamics of
political institutions so as to explain how the basic logic of political life
produces our environmental policies. Although ostensibly concerned with
explaining and criticizing process, much of the work in the political failure
stream lacks a clearly articulated normative theory of politics as process.

5. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving
Norms in Environmental Decsionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10992 (Nov. 2000); Sheila R.
Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998);
Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998).
6. See, e.g., ROBERT C. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS (1989).
7. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1 BELL J. OF ECON. &
MANAGEMENT SCI. 1 (1971), reprinted in CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 209, 225226 (George Stigler ed., 1988).
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Instead, the same substantive policy norms that establish the regulative ideals
of the policy failure literature do so here. Political failure analysis then
identifies explanations for why actual policy deviates from these policy ideals.
For example, the rational choice branch of political failure analysis grows
out of the same economics tradition that produced the economic theory of
optimal pollution, embracing the same policy goals and the same list of evident
policy failures. These include faulting environmental policy for not basing
pollution policy on cost-benefit analysis, for employing performance standards
instead of financial incentives or market-based programs such as emissions
trading as regulatory instruments, for mandating nationally uniform standards
that fail to take into account local variations in both the costs and the benefits
of controls, for regulating new sources of pollution more stringently than older
sources, for failing to prioritize regulatory targets so that the worst are
regulated first and for condoning wide discrepancies across regulatory
programs in costs per unit of health or environmental benefit.8 Rational choice
theory develops a theory of the basic logic of political life, which purports to
explain why these undesirable features of actual policy have come into being
in lieu of the preferred policies.
For rational choice, the sources of these policy defects can often be found
in the advantages concentrated economic interest groups have in organizing to
gain political success as compared to diffuse groups of environmental
consumers, be we breathers of clean air, drinkers of clean water, or people who
enjoy wilderness or believe in the preservation of species.9 Because they are
better able to surmount collective action problems so as to offer reelection
assets and services to politicians, the auto manufacturers, the steel industry, the
makers of petrochemicals and pesticides, the electric power industry, the
timber industry and similar others have more assets and services to trade with
politicians in exchange for favorable policies. The discrepancy between the
regulations of old versus new sources of environmental damage, for instance,
8. Stewart, supra note 1, at 27-38.
9. For a summary of the general rational choice presumption in favor of large concentrated
interests, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29 (1998). See
also Richard Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation, A Response
to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 542 (1997) (“The logic of collective action would suggest that
the large number of citizen-breathers, each with a relatively small stake in the outcome of a
particular standard-setting proceeding, will be overwhelmed in the political process by
concentrated industrial interests with a large stake in the outcome.. . .”); Daniel A. Farber, Politics
and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 56, 60 (1992) (rational choice theory
predicts “that environmental groups will not organize effectively and . . . environmental statutes
will not be passed”). Of course, the most general prediction from rational choice—that
environmental laws will not exist—has not been borne out by experience. Rational choice theory
makes numerous more micro-level predictions, however, that are more consistent with the
observed facts. See text accompanying note 12-14.
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purportedly reflects the success of existing industry to raise costs of entry for
potential rivals.10 Other types of regulation, such as the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration Regulations under the Clean Air Act, purportedly
demonstrate the ability of the rustbelt states to negate the competitive
advantage for attracting new industry that cleaner areas of the country might
have if the costs of environmental controls reflected localized cost/benefit
considerations.11
This interest group oriented rational choice explanation of political failure
seems more plausible when applied to the details of environmental
implementation, where it bears some kinship with earlier agency capture
theories, than it does as a creation story.12 Whereas the economic theory of
optimal pollution finds many existing policies to be too strict, rational choice’s
commitment to the comparative advantage of concentrated economic interest
groups over diffuse environmental interest groups predicts that environmental
legislation will be lax or non-existent.13 The history of enacting the original
environmental legislation of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s cannot easily be
made to fit such a model.14 To explain those enactments, the idea of symbolic
politics frequently comes into play.15 Occasionally, the conviction that
“something needs to be done” to address a particular social concern becomes
politically salient enough to a sufficient segment of the voting public that
10. See generally Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV.
1025 (1983). More broadly, rational choice theorists have developed a political theory of
regulation, which analyzes ways in which certain segments of industry might use regulations to
create barriers to competition. For a review of the arguments, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the
Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 750 (1999); Todd
Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999); Michael T. Maloney &
Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON.
99, 100 (1982); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political
Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139 (1975).
11. See, e.g., B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being
Protected? 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985).
12. See Wiener, supra note 10, at 750 (“[Rational choice] theory has difficulty explaining
the origin of national environmental law: indeed, it suggests that diffuse environmental benefits
and concentrated compliance costs will yield no environmental legislation. [It] does provide a
more robust explanation of regulatory content, demonstrating that rent-seeking by concentrated
interests can distort the hidden details of regulation.”).
13. For a review of the theory of collective action as it has been applied to enacting the
original wave of environmental legislation, see Schroeder, Rational Choice vs. Republican
Moment Explanations for Environmental Law, supra note 9.
14. Id.
15. E.g., John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233
(1990). For a review of the role of symbolic politics, see Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate
Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Law Enforcement? 80 B.U. L.
REV. 1227, 1247-1253 (2000). The locus classicus of this approach to political failure is the work
of Murray Edelman. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
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politicians cannot avoid responding in some fashion.
The general
inattentiveness of the public to the actual workings of public policy, however,
enables elected officials to placate the public by enacting laws that are
symbolically and rhetorically tough, but ultimately ineffective, thereby
placating public sentiment while not imposing any substantial costs on their
most important interest group supporters.16
There are other strands within the rational choice literature, but these
illustrate the two core conclusions of political failure analysis, which in one
way or another exhaust the possibilities: either minority interests have too
much influence on the outcomes, or majority interests do. The economic
theories of environmental politics are not the only ones to reach such
conclusions. A variety of non-economics based analyses lead to similar
results. Within the deep ecology literature, majoritarian political failure has
perhaps been a more frequent focus of attention compared to rational choice’s
emphasis on minority interest domination. The deep ecology critique of
majority preferences isn’t that they produce regulation that is too tough; rather,
those preferences result in policies that are insufficiently transformative.
Responsibility for such majority political failure is placed on the social,
cultural and economic conditions that produce those preferences.17
A prominent example is William Ophuls’ Ecology and the Politics of
Scarcity, which argues that majoritarian democratic government will be unable
to make the hard choices required to turn the path of human development away
from a cataclysmic limits to growth crisis and toward conditions of sustainable
development.18 While green scholarship has long since shied away from
Ophul’s recommended solution—highly authoritarian government—much of
that scholarship agrees with Ophuls insofar as it argues that politics as
currently practiced will be unable to make the correct environmental choices
and that it needs to undergo significant transformations in order to achieve
sustainable development.19 Driven by ever expanding demands for material
and consumption goods and underwritten by a refusal to understand the limits
16. See, e.g., Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 249, 292-95 (1990) (describing the
combination of interest group and symbolic politics theories in environmental lawmaking). On
the symbolic benefits of the 1970 CAAA, see Helen Ingram, The Political Rationality of
Innovation: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR
POLLUTION 20-23 (Ann F. Friedlaender ed., 1978).
17. This tendency within deep ecology was memorably encapsulated in Pogo’s remark, “We
have met the enemy and he is us.” See Walt Kelly, at http://www.bpib.com/kelly.htm (last visited
May 30, 2001).
18. WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977).
19. See, e.g., ROBERT C. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS (1989). See also DEMOCRACY AND GREEN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Brian
Doherty & Marins de Geus eds., 1996) (collection of essays explaining the connections between
democratic participation and deep ecology).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

REGULATING AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION

27

to growth, majoritarian politics will be unwilling and unable to make the
decisions necessary to become the Conserver Society that is required for the
long term well being of the planet and of humankind.20
Criticism of the excessive influence of concentrated economic interests is
certainly not absent in the green political failure literature, as well. Such
groups as Public Citizen and the Nader inspired PIRGs often seek to expose
the disproportionate influence of organized interest groups by tracing the level
of campaign contributions from various interests and using those contributions
to explain the votes of elected officials.21 This green minority failure analysis
shares much in common with its rational choice interest-group dominance
counterpart. Overall, the green literature has surveyed existing environmental
policy and politics and found the picture of political failure to be as dismal as
does the economics-inspired political failure scholarship.
As even this short and incomplete review shows, elements within the
policy failure and the political failure streams flow from a diverse set of
origins. The two streams also concentrate on quite different questions. The
policy failure literature identifies the policies we ought to have and the
political failure literature explains why politics prevents us from getting there.
Notwithstanding their many differences, almost all the contributions to either
literature are united by at least one shared view. Each views the relationship
between policy and politics as one in which ideal policy has clear normative
priority over politics. The policy failure literature often reads as if politics did
not exist. The political failure literature takes normative policy success as the
criteria against which to judge politics. First it identifies the policy ideal, next
it concludes that actual policy fails to achieve the ideal, then it develops an
explanation for the divergence in terms of minority or majority influence,
either of which is treated as undesirable to the extent it deflects public policy
from the ideal.22 Throughout, policy and politics stand in relationship to one
another as goal does to obstacle. The result is a decidedly dismal picture of
our environmental policies as well of our prospects for improving them.
20. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS, supra
note 19, at 217-272 (describing deficiencies of current political attitudes and outlining the changes
necessary for progressive environmentalism to succeed).
21. See Public Citizen’s analysis of the relationship between gambling industry campaign
contributions and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott’s “little-known legislative actions that
protected the casino industry,” at http://www.citizen.org/congress/reform/betting.htm (last visited
May 25, 2001); the Stop the Rollback campaign of the state PIRGs, aimed at protecting
environmental
laws
from
being
weakened
by
“powerful
polluters,”
at
http://www.stoptherollback.com/fact.html (last visited May 25, 2001).
22. Compare Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review? 101 YALE. L.J. 31 (1991) (arguing that rational choice theory cannot judge whether an
interest group has excessive influence until it adopts substantive norms for determining the
correct policy outcome, after which the group that influences deviation from that outcome is said
to have excessive influence).
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Both a practical and a conceptual reservation need to be raised against this
shared understanding and its most dreary implications. Practically speaking,
the environmental facts are more positive than this picture suggests. Take the
economic theory of optimal pollution. The policy failure viewpoint harshly
criticizes policy that falls short of the goals of efficiency and costeffectiveness. Holding policy to a standard of perfection, however, risks
overlooking a good result in the search for the ideal. An alternative evaluation
scheme would find positive value in policies that moved in constructive
directions, whether or not they achieved perfection. Judged against such an
alternative scheme, many of our environmental programs score well. While
each of our environmental programs might be unable to satisfy a standard of
being the most cost-effective means to any specific environmental objective,
the vast majority of them have produced benefits that exceed their costs, thus
satisfying a minimal cost-benefit test.23 There is thus a good economic reason
to conclude that we are better off for having them in place than we would have
been without them.24
Likewise, many environmental programs defy standard forms of political
failure analysis. Majoritarian influences have produced regulation that is far
from symbolic, extracting significant environmental benefits from costly
industry action. Private compliance costs for environmental regulations are
estimated to be around $150 billion per year and growing,25 and many of the
costs are from programs that concentrated industry interests would not have
chosen had they been in control of the process. Analyses based on interinterest group and inter-sectional rivalries may be partially explanatory of
some programmatic design and implementation decisions, but it is hard to
believe that they are the sole explanations, and in some cases such as the
regulation of automobile pollution, the relevant interest groups are heavily
aligned against stringent regulation in nearly monolithic fashion, and yet
regulation has still been stringent.

23. The difference between the policy failure stance and the alternative stance is one of
emphasis. Sometimes both perspectives are at work in a single assessment. E.g., J. CLARENCE
DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE
SYSTEM 148 (1998) (“When looked at as a whole, U.S. environmental progress has made
economic sense. It can be shown that benefits exceed costs in a great number of cases. At the
same time, it appears as if environmental gains have been achieved at unnecessarily high cost.”).
24. For a summary of the positive results of our air and water programs, see MARY
GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 6-7
(1999). For an even rosier recitation, see GREG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON EARTH: THE
COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM (1995). For the perspective that Easterbrook’s
account is in places too rosy, see ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, A MOMENT OF TRUTH:
CORRECTING THE SCIENTIFIC ERRORS IN GREGG EASTERBROOK’S A MOMENT ON THE EARTH
(1995), available at http://www.ed.org/pubs/Reports/a_eastbrk.html (last visited May 25, 2001).
25. DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 23, at 123.
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The conceptual reservation runs deeper. The structure of the relationship
between policy and politics that is implicit in the policy and political failure
literature does not withstand scrutiny. Carrying the logic of goal and obstacle
to its limits, the implication is that environmental success could be
satisfactorily achieved through the authoritarian imposition of environmental
policies that were strongly opposed by the vast majority of Americans. Indeed,
on this view, norms of democratic decision-making and popular assent ought
to be sacrificed if that would enable achieving the policy ideal. The goal-andobstacle structure, in other words, is a structure in which the role of democratic
decision-making is entirely instrumental, to be judged entirely by the results it
achieves. Because it always thwarts ideal policy, it is something to be
maneuvered around.
This is the wrong way to think of the relationship of policy to politics, for
several reasons. Precisely because authoritarian imposition of ideal policy is
not an option for any social structure within which any of us would wish to
live, some degree of public acceptability is an essential ingredient for sound
public policy, not a flaw that amounts at most to a necessary evil. Short of
massive funding of an environmental police force, furthermore, cooperation
between public and private actors will form a key component of any successful
environmental program, which provides an entirely pragmatic reason to ground
public policy in the public acceptance that normally attaches—at least
presumptively—to programs that have been enacted through democratic
processes. Beyond such pragmatic considerations, democratic decision
making practices reflect values independent of the instrumental consequences
of the resulting policies. Because they ought to acknowledge that individuals
are to be treated with equal dignity and respect, acts of government require
public justification through processes that are fair and open to all. Democratic
values are tragically foreshortened if politics is valued purely for the
instrumental results that democracy produces.
For reasons such as these, the structure of the relationship between policy
and politics cannot be that of goal and obstacle. It is better to think of it as a
recipe. Sound policy requires both justification against some instrumentalist
ideal and public justification and acceptability through adoption by democratic
institutions, and it requires an adequate amount of each. Policy should not be
slave to public passions or dominated by minority interests, but neither should
it make the political processes through which policies are adopted lexically
inferior to policy ideals. To meet this joint requisite, environmental policy
must be justified in terms of policy results, and also must be publicly justified
through adoption by public institutions employing satisfactory processes. The
best environmental policy in terms of moving a democratic society toward a
sustainable relationship between humankind and the biosphere is going to be
one that will most likely not be perfect when judged against any policy ideal,
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but it will nonetheless be the best policy insofar as it produces constructive,
sustained and acceptable polices and programs.26
Crucial to any recipe view of policy and politics is the idea that policy
needs both to move us adequately in a constructive direction, judged against
some normative ideal, and that it needs to be emerge from political processes
that are sufficiently acceptable to sustain democratic legitimacy. Currently,
neither policy failure analysis nor political failure analysis possesses any
cogent approach to assessing whether or not a given outcome or process is
adequate, as opposed to ideal. Each focuses on distinguishing the perfect from
the imperfect, not on developing a theory of the adequate. This essay cannot
be the occasion to work out such a theory. It can, however, provide an
illustration of how environmental policy might be evaluated when the goal and
obstacle perspective is changed to a recipe perspective. The remainder of the
essay will use the regulation of auto air emissions to illustrate some basic
features of a recipe view of policy and politics.27
Two minimum conditions are necessary, but almost certainly not
sufficient, for any policy to be evaluated favorably under a recipe approach to
policy and politics. First, policy needs to do more good than harm in moving
us toward a desirable objective. Second, policy must be broadly acceptable to
a majority of the public, in some sense that I will not attempt to define further
here. Viewed against these two minimum conditions, several features of our
attempts to regulate air emissions from automobiles suggest that those efforts
are candidates for favorable review under this approach, notwithstanding their
many flaws. Auto emissions policy has followed the path of majoritarian
26. Compare the similar idea developed by Gerald Gaus in his theory of constitution
building and the liberal demand that constitutional principles require public justification. “To
serve its purposes,” Gaus writes,
a constitutional order must not only be justified, but must be widely perceived as
such. . .As a moral agent, [one] must decide what arrangements are most conducive to
honoring his commitment to justify himself; confronted with a choice between an ideal
constitution and a less than ideal constitution that is widely embraced, [he] may rightly
concur that the latter actually is more conducive to moralized social relations. To insist
on what he believes to be right may lead to conflict, the breakdown of the political order,
and a return to the state of anarchy in which moralized relations are not generally
available. . . .[A] constitution that is less than perfect . . . may nevertheless be the best
constitution from the perspective of actually leading a life informed by moralized
relations.
GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM 214 (1995).
27. Regulation of automobile air emissions can be, and usually is, subsumed under the
broader category of mobile source emissions regulation, which includes as regulatory targets
trucks, buses, trains and planes as well as automobiles, and diesel powered as well as gasoline
powered engines. This essay concentrates on the automobile story, a story in itself sufficiently
complicated as to allow reference only to its most significant features. For an excellent summary
of the overall mobile source program, and more details on auto emissions regulation, see Arnold
W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL. LAWYER 309 (2000).
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acceptability at crucial stages, leaning toward programmatic decisions that
were relatively popular and away from those that were not. At those crucial
moments, policy has not been dominated by minority influence. Under the
goal and obstacle view, policy failed to make the right choices at those
moments because the policies chosen fell short of the ideal. Despite having
been less than perfect, however, auto air emissions regulations have proven
constructive in achieving real emissions reductions in those emissions. Thus,
those regulations meet the two minimum conditions for favorable evaluation
by a recipe understanding of policy and politics.
A favorable evaluation can only be a provisional one, though, because we
are at a point where auto emissions regulation needs to evolve further if it is to
continue making progress. Increases in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) will
negate gains we have made in reducing emissions per mile traveled through
exhaust emissions standards, evaporative emissions controls and the regulation
of fuel content. As those gains erode, the test of policy and politics will be
whether additional steps can be enacted and implemented that take us to the
next level of emissions reduction. If we make a successful transition to yet
more reductions of auto emissions through acceptable policy initiatives, it
stands to reason that one factor in that success will have been the thirty plus
years which we have already spent exploring alternatives and establishing a
solid public awareness of the need for controls. At this point, the jury is still
out. Nonetheless, the recipe perspective on policy and politics would not
condemn the choices we have made so far. Auto emissions policy to date as
has the potential to end as a success story rather than a failure.
II. POLICY AND POLITICS IN REGULATING AUTO AIR EMISSIONS
A.

The Nature of the Problem

Exhaust emissions from automobiles and other mobile sources have long
been known to be major sources of air pollution, and writing federal
regulations for them was a major feature of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 (1970 CAAA).28 As a result of those regulations and further rules
established under the 1990 Amendments, automobiles coming off the assembly
line are now capable of emitting 70 - 90% less of the criteria pollutants per
vehicle miles traveled than they did in 1970, and their emission of lead has
been reduced to zero as a result of removing lead from gasoline.
Still, the contribution of automobile emissions to the nation’s total loading
of air pollutants remains considerable. Of the six criteria air pollutants, auto
emissions account for three-quarters of the national total for carbon monoxide
(CO), one half of the total for oxides of nitrogen (NOx), and forty percent of

28. See text accompanying notes 39 - 42.
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the total for volatile organic compounds.29 These shares have remained
relatively stable throughout the thirty-year period since passage of the 1970
CAAA.30 Automobiles are also significant contributors to atmospheric
loadings of the remaining two criteria pollutants, particulate matter and sulphur
dioxide. Hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) are emitted from automobiles at
rates amounting to about 20% of the national HAP total.31 Finally, autos
produce appreciable amounts of greenhouse gases, as well, contributing 32%
of the nation’s carbon dioxide emissions in 1998.32 The elimination of lead
from gasoline has been the outstanding success story of auto emissions control,
dropping mobile source contribution to total airborne lead from 80% in 1970 to
13% in 1997, and dropping the overall total to just 1/20th of what it was in
1970.33
The continuing major role played by mobile sources in many aspects of air
quality is attributable to several causes.34 Actual performance of the
automobile fleet does not achieve all the emissions reductions of which cars
are technologically capable because EPA bases certification of new vehicles on
tests that do not accurately reflect real driving conditions. The performance of
emission control equipment also deteriorates in use, and existing inspection
and maintenance programs are inadequate to ensure that malfunctions are
quickly corrected or deliberate tampering quickly identified. Even if these
contributors were eliminated, however, the “most serious danger to the success
of mobile source controls programs [is] the continued upswing in auto
usage.”35
B.

The Policy Options

The problem of auto air emissions is but an instance of a wide category of
pollution problems associated with the production of material goods or the
conversion of matter into energy. In all such cases, the process or activity
generating the pollution can be schematized as consisting of three basic
components: (1) raw materials are supplied as input to the process, (2) the
process itself then modifies or combines these materials, (3) thereby creating

29. See Reitze, supra note 27, at 314-315 and sources cited.
30. See Figure 5.3 in ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE & POLICY 543 (3d ed. 2000) (comparing relative shares of criteria pollutants attributable
to major pollution sectors in 1970 to 1997).
31. Reitze, supra note 27, at 315.
32. Id.
33. Id. Lead is also the sole criteria pollutant to experience an enormous reduction in total
emissions, from about 220,000 tons in 1970 to a little less than 4,000 tons in 1998. So in 1998,
mobile sources contribute a smaller percentage to a much smaller total than they did in 1970.
34. This paragraph summarizes points made by Craig Oren, in Craig Oren, Getting
Commuters Out of Their Cars, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 157-174 (1998).
35. Id. at 160. See text accompanying notes 77-79.
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the final product or output plus pollution as a by-product. Complete analysis
of the pollution control problem associated with such processes then requires
consideration of a fourth component: (4) the frequency with which goods or
services are produced. Reducing the adverse health and environmental effects
of the pollution from such a process must necessarily rely upon changing one
or more of these four components. There are just these four possibilities:
 Pollution Capture: Trap the pollution after it has been produced but
before it has entered the environment.
 Input Change: Change the raw materials going into the process to ones
that result in less harmful pollution.
 Process Change: Make changes in the process so that it accomplishes
the same end function while generating less harmful pollution.
 Frequency Reduction: Reduce the frequency with which the polluting
process operates.
In the course of approximately thirty-one years of regulating auto emissions,36
federal policy has in one way or another tried each of these four techniques.
The brisk review of the history of that policy in the following section of
this essay shows how policy and politics have regularly interacted so that at
many significant decision points, the regulatory process has tended to shy
away from options perceived to be politically unpopular and toward those that
were more popular. The resulting mix of policies has emphasized pollution
capture and input changes because these can be implemented in ways that
target large corporations, and in which regulatory costs borne by automobile
drivers and users are not immediately visible on a day to day basis. It has also
de-emphasized directly imposing process change or frequency reduction, each
of which is for differing reasons politically unpopular. Frequency reduction
programs strike at the heart of American’s preferences for individual
convenience and flexibility. Imposing process change runs counter to the
American sense that as between government and business, business has great
advantages in entrepreneurial innovation, and that it is just such innovation that
needs to be tapped in order to produce the technological improvements crucial
to solving environmental problems.37 Government should set the goals and

36. This essay begins its account of auto emissions policy with the enactment of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (Dec. 31, 1970) [hereinafter
1970 CAAA]. For the earlier history, see FRANK GRAD ET AL., THE AUTOMOBILE AND THE
REGULATION OF ITS IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1974); JAMES F. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN,
POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH
MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940 - 1975 (1977).
37. One of the clearest instances of this general aversion is the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, which impose strict regulations on the handling of hazardous wastes after they are
produced, but which avoids regulating the production of those wastes. “[R]ather than place
restrictions on the generation of hazardous waste, which in many instances would amount to
interference with the production process itself, the committee has limited the responsibility of the
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protect against externalities, but it should not pick technological winners and
losers. Aided by these supporting values, industry has successfully resisted
most proposals to mandate process changes,38 while losing many battles with
respect to costly pollution capture measures. Together, these preferences and
values help explain why policy has shied away from direct process change
mandates and frequency reduction programs.
C. Highlights of Our Efforts to Reduce the Harmful Effects of Auto Emissions
The single most debated provision of the precedent-breaking 1970 CAAA,
in both the chambers of the Congress and in the media, was Congress’ mandate
of a ninety percent reduction in hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions
from automobiles by the 1975 model year, as well as a similarly ambitious
reduction in emissions of nitrogen oxides by the 1976 model year.39 Congress
established these goals after estimating what contribution the reduction of auto
emissions would have to make to achieve an overall objective of attaining air
quality levels protective of public health and welfare.40 In reasoning backward
from a public health objective in this way, the 90th Congress self-consciously
“abandon[ed] the old assumption of requiring the use of only whatever
technology is already proven and of permitting pollution to continue when it is
not economically feasible to control it.”41 Congress had become frustrated
with the old way of doing things because over the course of the 1950’s and

generator for hazardous waste to one of providing information.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, 94th
Cong. 26 (1976). See also American Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185-1186 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (construing RCRA’s jurisdiction as limited to materials that have exited from “the
industry’s ongoing production process”).
38. The general political aversion to imposing direct process changes does not guarantee that
legislation will never intrude on production process decisions. After twenty years of small
progress in controlling HAPs, for example, in 1990 Congress revised the HAPs provision of the
CAA in such a way as to authorize EPA to set HAP standards based on what is achievable
through “application of measures, processes, methods, systems or techniques including, but not
limited to . . . process changes, substitution of materials or other modifications.” 42 U.S.C. §
7412(d)(2) (2001). Should EPA base a HAP standard on process modifications, the resulting
standards would not legally compel industry to adopt the process modifications identified by EPA
as the basis for that HAP standard—it would only compel plant performance equal to what EPA
determines could be achieved by doing so—but practically speaking it would have that effect.
39. CAA Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. at 1690 (1970) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2001)).
40. The estimates were based on analyses performed by the National Air Pollution Control
Administration, a subunit of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which was later
incorporated into the Environmental Protection Agency. For the history of their derivation, see
GRAD, supra note 36, at 33-36.
41. Senate Debate on S. 4358, 116 CONG. REC. § 32919 (Sept. 21, 1970) (statement of
Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY)), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93
Cong. 1, Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, at 262 (Serial No. 93-18,
1974) [hereinafter 1970 Leg. History].
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1960’s the State of California and the federal government had regularly
engaged the automobile industry in conversations about the ability of that
industry to abate emissions to satisfactory levels, only to be met as regularly by
the response that this was a tough problem needing more research. A solution
would take a few years longer.42
The auto emissions rollback provision passed squarely in the face of the
auto industry’s insistence that such ambitious targets could not be met. There
can be little doubt that the auto industry vigorously opposed the 1970 tailpipe
mandate,43 and hence little doubt that its passage constitutes an instance in
which the presumptive rational choice advantages of such concentrated
economic interests were defeated by a broad public health goal.
The tailpipe mandate was also not a piece of symbolic legislation designed
to gull the public into believing that their government had put a strong arm on
industry, whereas the reality would turn out to be a failure of enforcement. To
the contrary, at the time of its conception, this and other technology-forcing
provisions of the 1970 CAAA were thought by the Congress to be rational and
appropriate means to change the incentive structure facing industry. Over the
course of the preceding fifteen years Congress had dealt with the auto industry
and others on the basis of standards determined by what was technologically
feasible, it had become aware that such regulations set up a perverse incentive
for industry to slow walk through the development of innovative pollution
reduction techniques, because success in innovation would only raise the worry
that the next round of regulations would rachet down restrictions on emissions
still further. In the 1970 CAAA, Congress switched the incentives by setting
an ambitious goal and then threatening sanctions for failure to meet it. In this
way, Congress sought to provide the industry with self-interested reasons to
“stretch[] the [technological] possibilities . . . to find ways to do things that we
are told in many, many instances cannot be done.”44
As further evidence that Congress was trying to craft an effective program
rather than engaging in symbolic posturing, the record shows that when
Congress enacted the mandate, it explicitly acknowledged that the automobile
industry might not be able to meet the ambitious goals it was setting.45
Congress was not thereby enacting a law that would penalize firms for being

42. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR
VEHICLES 12 (1982).
43. See CHARLES O. JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF POLLUTION
CONTROL 195-198 (1975).
44. EXECUTIVE SESSION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 91st Cong. 11415 (Aug. 31, 1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie), Edmund S. Muskie Archives, Bates College,
Lewiston, Maine, Folder SE 3041-4.
45. For a contrary view of the 1970 CAAA, see Ingram, supra note 16, at 22. (“The
characteristics of the air pollution issue in 1970 foreordained a policy-making process that
concentrated on setting high goals without giving much attention to efficient implementation.”).
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unable to do the impossible, nor was it irrationally proposing to shut down a
major segment of the U.S. economy.46 To the contrary, Congress anticipated
the possibility that the industry might return to them in several years seeking
an extension, and it was assuming responsibility for revisiting its decision in
subsequent years. Under Congress’ plan, however, such reconsideration would
only come after industry had engaged in several years of effort to meet the
mandate, so that Congress would have both the benefit of the additional
industry experience upon which to base subsequent deliberations, and the
ability to assess the seriousness of the industry’s attempts.47 As Senator
Muskie said to his colleagues on the Senate floor, “Congress, I assume, will be
in session in 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 . . . The companies would be in
a position to make their case. If the Congress, which would have made the
policy in the first instance, is persuaded that the industry cannot do the job,
Congress could change the policy.”48 Asking for the problem to be brought
back to the Congress for adjustments if it was not working was hardly a
strategy for fooling the public with symbolic but empty rhetoric.
As it turned out, Congress was indeed in session in 1974, when it
postponed the goals for one model year.49 EPA granted an additional
extension in 197550 and Congress followed suit once more in 1977.51 These
extensions elongated the compliance period, but they did not entirely remove
the pressure on the industry to find solutions to technical problems. Congress
was able to set lower standards for model years 1980 and 1981,52 and the 1990
Amendments lowered them still further.53 Pursuant to study provisions
contained in the 1990 Amendments, the EPA has recommended further

46. The 1970 CAAA provided for a $10,000 fine for each automobile sold without a
certification that that car type met federal emissions standards.
47. Congress also built into the 1970 CAAA ability for the Administrator of the EPA to
grant a one-year extension on the deadlines, if certain statutory conditions were met. Upon a
petition for such an extension, the Administrator declined to grant it—further evidence of the lack
of interest group capture of the regulatory process. The industry did persuade the D.C. Circuit to
reverse the Administrator’s decision. Int’l Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
48. Senate Debate on S. 4358, 116 Cong. Rec. 32905 (Sept. 21, 1970) (remarks of Senator
Muskie), reprinted in 1970 Leg. History, supra note 41, at 236.
49. The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat.
246 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3281, 3298.
50. Chrysler Corp., Ford Motor Co., and General Motors Corp., Applications for Suspension
of 1977 Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emissions Standards; Decision of Administrator, 40 Fed. Reg.
11,900 (1975).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 201, 202(b), 91 Stat. 685, 751-52.
52. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (g).
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tightening of the exhaust emissions standards as so-called Tier II measures.54
The 1990 Amendments also contain provisions tightening controls on
evaporative losses, which result from vapor leakages around the various
components of the fuel system, as well as from refueling itself.
One of the perplexities of retrospective policy analysis is that one can
seldom be totally confident about what would have happened had a regulation
not been put into place, so that one can seldom determine conclusively the net
impact of that regulation. In the case of the auto emissions mandate, it is
possible that the auto industry would have solved the technical problems
associated with the catalytic converter just as quickly as they did once the
mandate of the 1970 CAAA was put in place.55 Evidence from early studies of
the effects of the standards argues decidedly against that possibility,
however.56 Early statistical analyses attribute considerable explanatory power
to the legislative standards for reducing levels of auto emissions.57 The
mandate thus did not amount to an “aspirational” command that produced very
little by way of additional progress.58 Even if the industry could be confident
that EPA and Congress would not actually shut the industry down, mere
“cosmetic efforts industry felt compelled to make in order to establish its good
faith could not, given the resourcefulness of its engineers, but have produced
some improvement.”59
The 1970 emissions reduction mandate was a tough, calculated effort to
incentivize the auto industry to lower auto emissions, and as such a substantial

54. U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle
Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10,
2000).
55. As it was, the subsequent extensions of the 1975/76 deadlines may be taken as some
vindication of the Nixon administration’s initial proposal for a 1980 deadline. In the context of
the political struggle between President Nixon and Senator Muskie for the environmental vote,
the Senate’s cutting the deadline in half had political implications in addition to whatever the
public health consequences of first imposing and then relaxing a tight standard might have been.
The political dynamics of 1969-70 and how they may have affected environmental legislation are
explored in Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 313 (1985).
56. E.g., ROBERT CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 92 (1986) (“There is
little evidence to support the view that emissions rates would have fallen significantly without the
emissions standards program.”).
57. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR
VEHICLES 47 (1981). In addition, the higher emissions standards being observed in other
developed countries, such as Canada and the Western European countries, without mandatory
standards lends further support to the conclusion that the standards had real effects. See
CRANDALL, supra note 56, at 93.
58. The classic critique of so-called aspirational statutes—ones that sound nice but cannot
possibly be met—is Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The
Limits of “Spirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. (1978).
59. See DAVID CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS 2-114 (1981).
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defeat for the automobile manufacturers.
From an elected official’s
perspective, it was also a wonderful conjunction of a promising regulatory
strategy and political popularity. In the years immediately preceding passage
of the 1970 CAAA, the auto industry had badly damaged its public image as
the result of two separate incidents. First, General Motor’s representatives had
confessed publicly before the Congress that it had hired a private investigator
to snoop into the private life of Ralph Nader after publication of his broadside
against the auto industry, Unsafe At Any Speed.60 Second, the Justice
Department had sued the auto industry for collusion in suppressing the
development of control technology, leading to a consent decree that prohibited
joint activities regarding pollution control.61 As a result, the public was well
primed to believe that the automobile industry was not to be trusted when it
denounced sharper emissions reductions as impossible to achieve, that the
industry was in fact capable of doing more and doing better, and that tough
government insistence on industry action was an appropriate way to deal with
their recalcitrance.62
At the same time as the mandate was a politically attractive regulatory
option, further legal directives aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of that
mandate were not. Pollution control equipment deteriorates in use, so that
passing a controlled emissions test with vehicles fresh out of the factory cannot
certify that those vehicles will continue to emit no more than allowable
emissions once they are on the road. Testing and estimates by EPA in 1982

60. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN-DANGERS OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).
61. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass’n, 199 Trade Cas. ¶ 72902 (C.D. Cal. 1969);
Goldstein & Howard, Antitrust Law and the Control of Auto Pollution, Rethinking the Alliance
Between Competition and Technical Progress, 10 ENVTL. L. 517 (1980).
62.
The political climate that ultimately precipitated the stringent emissions standards began
to develop in 1965, when Ralph Nader published his famous indictment of the industry
and was treated to a personal investigation at the industry’s expense. Seldom has an
attempt at intimidation backfired so spectacularly. The Nader affair led to a dramatic set
of hearings in which the president of General Motors was forced to apologize to Nader in
front of a congressional committee and a national television audience. Serious and
lingering damage was done to the political credibility of the automobile manufacturers—
damage soon compounded by allegations concerning their handling of the air pollution
problem itself. . . .[Los Angeles County] supervisors charged that [a joint auto industry
committee set up to conduct pollution control research] was in fact a collusive
arrangement to prevent the introduction of controls. As evidence that industry
developments were being suppressed rather than propagated, they cited the package of
control devices developed by Chrysler but kept off the market until California legislation
forced its introduction. . . . This incident unquestionably added to the public’s impression
of recalcitrance and bad faith on the part of the industry.
Henry D. Jacoby & John D. Steinbruner, The Context of Current Policy Discussion, in CLEARING
THE AIR 10-11 (Henry D. Jacoby et al. eds., 1973).
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indicated that total actual emissions from autos on the road ranged from 5%
(for NOx) to 76% (for CO) higher than they would be if actual performance
matched the statutory emissions requirements.63 In 1993 model year studies,
the comparable figures were between 50% and 400%.64 Programs of
inspection and maintenance (I & M) can markedly reduce this discrepancy, by
ensuring that the pollution control equipment installed on automobiles remains
in good repair. Normal wear and tear is not the only obstacle to achieving
actual reductions commensurate with the statutory standards. Late 1970’s
studies by EPA suggested that auto owners tampered with nearly 20% of new
automobiles to disable their emissions equipment in order to achieve better
performance.65 Such tampering can also be minimized through I & M
requirements.
Despite their evident ability to reduce emissions, I & M programs have
foundered throughout the history of the CAA.66 They have encountered
resistance partly because the technologies for performing the inspections are
themselves far from perfect, so that there has been some skepticism about their
actual ability to produce air quality improvements.67 At the same time, the
onus of justifying these programs imposes a heavy burden on EPA and the
states because the programs are so inconvenient and time consuming for the
driving public that neither the federal government nor the states are eager to be
identified as the one imposing highly objectionable programs on the driving
public.
In addition to emissions control mandates, from its very inception United
States auto emissions policy has also included the regulation of fuel content.
The most dramatically effective single measure in our entire auto emissions
policy has been the removal of lead from gasoline.68 Under the 1970 CAAA,
unleaded gasoline was required to be made available to fuel new vehicles,

63. CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 56, at 94-95.
64. Oren, supra note 34 at 158. Some of this discrepancy is attributable to the inability of
the standard federal testing protocol for autos to match actual driving conditions, under which
motorists experience circumstances such as sharp accelerations, which drive up actual emissions.
Id.
65. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR
VEHICLES 70 (1981).
66. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 30, at 619-620 (a brief summary of problems with I &
M programs); see also Todd A. Stewart, E-Check: A Dirty Word in Ohio’s Clean Air Debate—
Ohio’s Battle Over Automobile Emissions Testing, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 265 (2001) (detailing one
state’s problems with its I & M efforts).
67. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER §3.29 n.42,
and sources cited (Pocket Part, 2000) (complaints about the effectiveness of testing leads to
resistance to implementing I & M programs).
68. For a more complete review of the interesting history of the elimination of lead from
gasoline, see Thomas McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 947-952 (1994).
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because the lead in gasoline destroys the catalysts in the catalytic converters
that became the technology of choice for meeting the exhaust mandates.69
Lead came under further scrutiny due to its adverse health effects. Operating
under a provision of the CAA that permitted regulation of gasoline additives
that “will endanger the public health or welfare,” in 1973 the Administrator
ordered a reduction in the lead content in all gasolines.70 That decision
ultimately was sustained by the D.C. Circuit in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,71 one of
the landmark cases ratifying the precautionary nature of modern environmental
legislation. Subsequently, continuing problems with misfueling and additional
research into the adverse health effects of lead prompted the Congress to order
the complete removal of lead when the Air Act was amended in 1990.72
Over the years, we have learned more about how the composition of
gasoline can be tweaked to achieve emissions reductions. The 1990
Amendments called for the use of reformulated gasoline (RFG) in areas that
remained significantly in non-attainment for ozone. Currently, the RFG
requirement applies on a mandatory basis to nine metropolitan areas, with
other areas able to elect its use as part of an overall air quality maintenance
strategy. The mandatory areas alone encompass 22% of all the gasoline sold in
the United States, and the reformulated product produces 15% fewer
hydrocarbon emissions than normal gasoline—plus reducing HAPs emissions,
as well.73
New requirements in both pollution capture and fuel content have been
developed throughout the history of auto air emissions control, and are
continuing still. EPA as announced the so-called Tier II emissions standards,
with will lower NOx from the current 0.4 gpm to 0.07 gpm. It also proposes
gradually to bring light-duty trucks and SUVs into compliance with roughly
the same tailpipe standards as apply to autos.74 EPA has also successfully
brokered development of a national low emissions vehicle (NLEV) program
under which automobile manufacturers will market nationwide vehicles

69. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2001).
70. 38 Fed. Reg. 33, 734 (1973).
71. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(n) (2001).
73. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 30, at 612-13.
74. U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle
Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10,
2000). Pollution capture regulations now also encompass on board computer diagnostic systems
(OBD) designed to signal motorists when evaporative emissions or exhaust emissions standards
have been exceeded, and to facilitate proper maintenance by making diagnostic information
available to mechanics.
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meeting California’s LEV emissions standards.75 As to fuel content, EPA has
announced rules reducing the sulphur content of gasoline.76
The accomplishments of these measures have been considerable. For some
time, however, policy makers have recognized that such success alone will not
be sufficient to continue to make truly substantial reductions in the emissions
from automobiles. Total atmospheric loading from autos depends upon the
frequency with which autos are used and upon the processes autos use to
convert matter to energy as much as it does upon the inputs used and the
manner in which outputs are captured.77 Without measures taken to alter these
first two factors, increased auto use threatens to swamp tailpipe and fuel
content standards. To illustrate, EPA has estimated that by year 2015, total
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by autos in the United States will have increased
nearly four fold since 1970, and this increase will have the effect of reversing
the slope of the annual hydrocarbons emissions curve from decreasing to
increasing.78 The combination of increasing population, increased VMT per
capita, and extremely low occupancy rates has proven to be a devastating
combination counteracting emissions gains made elsewhere.79
The 1970 CAAA contemplated a role for frequency reduction, in the form
of transportation control measures (TCMs), as part of an overall air quality
management strategy for automobiles. In this instance, the contemplation was
much more symbolic than actual. Over the years, frequency reduction plans
have proven to be the third rail of air pollution policy. EPA itself received one
of the first shocks when it responded to the failure of the Los Angeles air basin
to submit an implementation plan that would meet the original statutory
compliance dates. Obligated by statute to fill in the resulting regulatory gap, in
1975 EPA proposed a federal implementation plan (FIP) that utilized drastic
gasoline rationing measures among its strategies to reduce vehicle miles
traveled sufficiently to meet the attainment deadlines.80 The move proved so
unpopular that Congress shortly stripped the EPA of the authority to include
TCMs as part of a FIP.81

75. U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: State Commitments to National Low Emission Vehicle Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 926 (Jan.
7, 1998).
76. 65 Fed. Reg. 6698.
77. Id.
78. U.S. EPA website, at http://www.epa.gov/oms/04-ozone.htm.
79. While VMT have gone up, occupancy rates have actually declined, exacerbating the
problem of vehicle use. Vehicle occupancy dropped from 1.3 passengers per trip to and from
work in 1977 to 1.1 in 1990. Oren, supra note 34, at 163 (citing Federal Highway Administration
statistics).
80. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 30, at 619 (recounting history of Los Angeles FIP).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

42

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:21

Historically, while states have always retained authority to include more
aggressive TCMs in their implementation, measures that have been attempted,
such as car pool lanes, car free downtown areas, restrictions on parking, and
other such have had negligible impacts on auto use and have consequently
contributed insignificantly to the overall improvement in air quality.
When Congress wrote the 1990 Amendments, it enacted a new variant to
such measures, one that focused its attention on large employers and only
obliquely regulated individual car users. The 1990 trip reduction program
directed major employers in the same non attainment metropolitan areas as are
covered by the RFG requirement to create programs and revise company
policies so as to achieve reductions in solo employee computes during rush
hour, or to shift such trips out of the rush hours.82 Implementation planning for
the trip reduction program proved disastrous and highly unpopular, and
Congress repealed the measure before the trip reduction plans were to go into
effect.83 The trip reduction program may well have been a flawed policy from
its inception.84 Even so, its huge unpopularity was more a product of the fact
that “the ability of employers to persuade employees to reach work other than
by driving alone is limited by the unattractiveness of the alternatives,”85 than of
any influential cost-effectiveness critique. In the short term, TCMs are
unlikely to play any substantial role in emissions reduction policy precisely
because they are so unattractive to the motoring public.
In fact, the federal governments overall policy toward frequency of
automobile use has actually undermined air quality improvement goals.
Federal emissions control programs have attempted to reduce auto emissions
primarily through pollution capture and input change efforts. After thirty years
of development, these are now experiencing diminishing returns. At the same
time, other federal policies have been making reliance on the automobile even
more attractive compared to the alternatives, and hence politically even harder
to change. Those other policies do not come from any environmental statute,
but rather from the role of the federal government in developing and
maintaining our national highway system. They have had the effect of
encouraging the use of highways, and to increase VMT, both indirectly and
directly. First, the federal government is a major funder of highway
construction and maintenance. Both in the current transportation bill, TEA-

82. Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 103, 104 Stat. 2399, 2438 (1990) (enacting § 182(d) of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d) (1994)) (repealed 1995).
83. The details of the trip reduction program and its demises have been exhaustively studied
by Craig Oren. See Oren, supra note 34. See also Craig Oren, The Mandate From Hell: How the
Trip Reduction Program Came Into Being, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 123 (1998).
84. This is Craig Oren’s conclusion. See supra note 83.
85. Oren, supra note 34, at 222.
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21,86 as well as its immediate predecessor, ISTEA,87 the federal government
allocates approximately forty billion dollars a year to transportation, all but a
minuscule amount of which goes to new construction, maintenance and
repair.88
By improving the conditions of our highways, federal policy lowers the
costs of using them, and thus encourages their use. Beyond this direct effect
on VMT, however, transportation policy also has the effect of facilitating the
phenomenon of urban sprawl, thus stimulating conditioned reliance on the
automobile by increasing the costs of alternatives. Urban sprawl facilitates the
dispersal of population centers as well as employment centers. Whereas welldefined residential areas combined with few and well-defined central business
districts create conditions conducive to successful and efficient mass transit,
decentralized population and employment centers make mass transit
convenient and economical enough to compete with the automobile as an
Highway policy attests
attractive alternative practically impossible.89
dramatically to the influence that Americans’ love affair with their automobiles
has had on air pollution. The politically attractive choices made in this area
have contributed more to the air pollution problem than they have as of yet to
its solution.90
Our policies toward process change in the auto emissions area have been
more mixed than those toward frequency reduction. Consistent with the
country’s aversion to direct government designation of acceptable
technologies, federal policy has not sought to direct the industry to build
substitutes to the internal combustion engine (ICE). In 1969, Senator Gaylord
Nelson had introduced a bill to abolish the ICE, but the greatest pay off from
that proposal through Senator Muskie’s use of it to persuade some of his

86. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23, 49 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999)).
87. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105
Stat. 1914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
88. See Federal Highway Administration at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21/funding.htm.
On the transportation legislation and its environmental impacts, see Liam A. McCann, TEA-21:
Paving Over Efforts To Stem Urban Sprawl, and Reduce America’s Dependence on the
Automobile, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 857 (1999).
89. See McCann, supra note 88.
90. The explanations for increased VMT are complex, encompassing cultural, demographic
and economic changes that contribute to the impetus toward urban sprawl itself as well as to our
driving patterns. More women in the workplace, the entrance of the baby boom generation into
the workforce, income growth, increases in single occupancy vehicle commutes, decreases in the
cost of vehicle use, the changing character of suburbs and exurbs, much of it made possible by the
post-industrial economy no longer wed to a central business district, the importance of
convenience and control of one’s schedule, and other factors all play a role. For a fuller account,
see Oren, supra note 34, at 160-174.
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colleagues to vote for his more moderate set of Clean Air Act Amendments.91
In 1979, Congress missed an opportunity to use its bail out of the then failing
Chrysler Corporation as the occasion to impose conditions on Chrysler’s use of
public funds that would have made Chrysler a leader in developing alternatives
to the ICE.
On the other hand, aggressive pursuit of tailpipe standards may have the
effect of producing incentives for the introduction of alternative propulsion
technologies into the personal automobile. The leader in this strategy has been
the state of California, not the federal government. In 1990, California
embarked on a plan to stimulate the production of a zero emissions vehicle.
(ZEV).92 Under the original formulation of its plan, automobile manufacturers
were to generate sales of ZEVs on a gradually increasing scale that eventually
would amount to ten percent of the new car sales market statewide by the year
2003.93 In the years subsequent, California successively suspended the
intermediate requirements of producing two to five percent ZEV sales in the
years prior to 2003. On September 7, and 8, 2000, however, the California Air
Resources Board considered a petition from industry to suspend the 2003 ten
percent requirement altogether. Rather than agreeing, the “Board . . . resolved
that the basic [ten percent] ZEV requirement be retained and implemented.”94
California’s ZEV requirement is technology forcing with respect to alternatives
to the ICE in the same way as the federal tailpipe standards have been
technology-forcing with respect to the catalytic converter.
California’s ten percent requirement can partially be met by the sale of cars
satisfying a PZEV requirement.95 Because total compliance cannot be
achieved in this or any other manner except by actually selling a number of
ZEVs, however, production and sale of some ZEVs will be necessary for
manufacturers to comply with the mandate. With respect to stimulating
changes from the ICE, this fact is a crucial feature of California’s program,
because although the PZEV requirements can be met by vehicles using ICEs or
91. Interview with Leon Billings (April 1, 2000).
92. For more details on California’s entire regulatory approach, see Leslie Harrison Reed, Jr.
California Low-Emission Vehicle Program: Forcing Technology and Dealing Effectively with the
Uncertainties, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 695 (1997); Llyod S. Dixon & Steven Garber,
California’s Ozone Reduction Strategy for Light-Duty Vehicles Direct Costs, Direct Emission
Effects, and Market Responses (Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 1996), available on Westlaw, TPAll library, MR-695-ICJ; Ashley Morris Bale, The Newest Frontier in Motor Vehicle Control:
The Clean Fuel Vehicle, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 213 (1995).
93. See California Air Resources Board Fact Sheet, 02/23/01, available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov (last visited May 1, 2001).
94. Id.
95. PZEVs are vehicles that satisfy Supra Ultra Low Emissions Vehicle (SULEV) emissions
standards, have zero evaporative emissions, and come with a 150,000 mile warranty. California
Air Resources Board, Executive Summary to the Staff Report of the 2000 Zero Emission Vehicle
Biennial Review, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov (last visited Dec. 1, 2000).
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hybrid ICE/electric motor systems, the ZEV requirements cannot. ZEVs must
be vehicles powered by either batteries or fuel cells. Thus a real ZEV standard
pushes the development of such alternative vehicles, and provides the best
prospect we currently have to harness the innovation and entrepreneurial
creativity that industry has always asserted as the justification for government
to set the goals and then permit industry to meet them.
The current competition between battery-powered vehicles and those using
fuel cells illustrates this entrepreneurial and competitive process. When the
ZEV program was first introduced, the major focus of attention was the
battery-powered auto. Improvements in battery capacity and weight sufficient
to make electric cars widely attractive have proven illusive over the past
decade, however. At this stage in their development, battery-powered vehicles
are saddled with limited range, small size and burdensome recharge
requirements that suggest they will never achieve major market penetration.
Attention and expectations have recently begun to shift to the fuel cell, with
some analysts now predicting that it is the fuel cell that will be the technology
of choice in a transition to so-called sustainable mobility.96
It is not clear whether research on alternative vehicles can produce
products acceptable to an appreciable portion of the automobile buying public.
Nor is it clear whether California will be able to maintain its ZEV requirement
only by the expedient of extending the compliance date. If it does extend the
date, the history with the federal tailpipe standards should counsel caution in
announcing the failure of the ZEV mandate on that account. The federal
timetable was relaxed several times, but the goals originally set in 1970 were
never abandoned, and they were eventually met and exceeded.97 Earnest
technology-forcing seems much more promising as a means to gain the
progress that it needed here than does a policy that fails to include technologyforcing features.
III. CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades, auto air emissions regulations have achieved
genuine and significant reductions in the production of health and environment
harmful pollution from the on-the-road fleet of automobiles. These regulations
have imposed substantial costs on industry and hence on the consuming public.
We are better off to have had them in place. The pattern of our approach to
regulation shows a clear tendency to shy away from strategies that would
prove unpopular with the American public and toward those that were either
affirmatively popular or else broadly acceptable to the public. That meant we
96. Presentation by Lee Lynd, Professor of Chemical and Biochemical Engineering,
Dartmouth College, given at Duke University’s Environmental Institutions Workshop (Mar. 21,
2001) (copies on file with the author).
97. See pages 36 to 37, above.
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lost opportunities for more substantial gains, and our policies have certainly
deviated from an ideal policy, whatever ideal policy one chooses. Under a
recipe view of the between policy and politics, falling short of policy
perfection is not a sufficient ground for condemning the policies that
democratic institutions have promulgated.
As to whether or not regulation of auto air emissions might be called an
environmental success story, the jury is still out. The political dynamics
preventing sterner frequency reduction measures or the direct imposition of
alternatives to the ICE promise to prevent use of such policy tools any time
soon, and the diminishing prospects of further returns from fuel content and
tailpipe emissions controls may soon be more than offset by the progresscanceling consequences of increased VMT. Achieving the ultimate reductions
that are necessary for long-term success, therefore, seems heavily dependent
upon technology-forcing strategies such as the California ZEV approach.
Should those strategies succeed in turning the crucial corner toward marketacceptable alternative vehicles, history will record ours as a period of a
successful transition to more sustainable mobility. In that case, the political
success of the past thirty years in maintaining strong citizen support for some
sort of on going pollution reduction efforts may well be considered an essential
element of that success story. If so, the mix of policy and politics in the
regulation of auto air emissions will prove to have been much more
satisfactory than a reading of either the policy failure literature or the political
failure literature would suggest.

